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CONFERÊNCIA

DO

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The Importance of Liberating Indonesia From East Timor

Universidade Católica

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Universidade Católica
(Prof. Carvalho Guerra - Presidente da Secção Regional do Norte da Universidade Católica Portuguesa)

... O prof. Barbedo, que irá fazer a apresentação do nosso conferencista, acabou de me dizer que o título é um título extremamente interessante - "Por que é que a Indonésia se tem que ver livre de Timor". Creio que este título é altamente sugestivo para todos nós. Não queria começar esta sessão sem dizer publicamente quanto tenho apreciado nos últimos sete anos - durante os seis como Vice-Reitor da Universidade do Porto e este ano que, de algum modo, tenho continuado a ter a honra de ser amigo do Prof. Barbedo - esta luta extraordinária que um professor universitário da Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade do Porto, um belíssimo investigador, tem devotado a uma causa de que tantos de nós nos temos esquecido. Gostava de dizer isto publicamente. Chega-me a enternecer o autêntico espírito de missão que o tem animado. Isso tem-me tocado muito profundamente.

Let me also say to Prof. Anderson how much honored we are to have you with us here and the real privilege for having you talking about something wich is very particular in the souls of the Portuguese people, mainly in the souls of the Portuguese Christianity, to have you with us knowing your background and knowing that you speak like us. Thank you very much for coming, thank you very much for being with us. Prof. Barbedo will introduce Prof. Anderson.

(Prof. Barbedo)

Antes de apresentar o Prof. Ben Anderson, queria agradecer ao Sr. Prof. Carvalho Guerra as suas palavras, fruto de uma grande amizade, e gostava também de dizer aqui, pela primeira vez em público que, nestes sete anos, se alguma coisa se fez, muito se deve ao Sr. Prof. Cavalho Guerra. Muitas vezes lhe tenho pedido ajuda e sempre encontrei o apoio mais total e uma capacidade muito grande de o tornar efectivo em acções concretas. Por isso devo dizer que a Universidade do Porto, e eu particularmente, estamos extremamente gratos ao Sr. Prof. Carvalho Guerra. Já telefonei para sua casa às duas e três horas da manhã por causa de Timor e sou sempre acolhido de uma forma extremamente reconfortante. Esta liberdade de poder telefonar a alguém às três da manhã, lançar um S.O.S. por Timor e ser imediatamente acolhido de braços abertos e, a seguir a isso e depois de não sei quantos telefonemas receber às quatro da manhã a resposta que é necessária para avançar com qualquer coisa, pois bem, isso aconteceu com o Sr Porf. Carvalho Guerra e por isso eu gostava de lhe manifestar aqui o meu maior reconhecimento pessoal e o da Universidade do Porto.

Relativamente ao Prof. Benedict Anderson gostaria de dizer que é cidadão irlandês, nascido em Kunming, na China (1936) licenciado pela Universidade de Cambrigde (1957) e doutorado pela Cornell University, Ithaca, U.S.A., em 1976. Lecciona nessa universidade desde 1967.

Presentemente é "Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies", Professor Catedrático de Ciências Políticas e Estudos Asiáticos. O título de "Aaron L Binenkorb Professor" é uma alta distinção que a Cornell University atribui a um único professor cujo curriculo e perfil académico tornaram particularmente notável na área dos Estudos Internacionais.

O Professor Benedict Anderson é, além disso, Director do "Cornell Modern Indonesia Project" e fundador e editor do "Indonesia Journal".

Escreveu três livros sobre a Indonésia e outro sobre o Sião. Ao longo dos últimos vinte anos tem publicado análises sobre a classe politico-militar indonésia, que são muito consultados, inclusivé pela própria Embaixada Indonésia nos EUA.

Tendo publicado em 1972 "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia" em que desmontava algumas pseudo-verdades propagandeadas pelo Regime de Suharto relativas ao golpe que o levou ao poder, e tendo apresentado, junto do Congresso Americano e das Nações Unidas, por diversas vezes, testemunhos de violações dos direitos humanos em Timor e na Indonésia, foi por isso colocado na lista negra das personalidades a quem o Governo Indonésio veda a entrada no País. Sendo de há longa data um crítico da posição americana em relação a Timor, nem por isso deixa de ser ouvido pela Administração Americana. E tendo sido recentemente indicado um novo embaixador americano para Jakarta, o Prof. Ben Anderson, por ser considerado um dos maiores especialistas em assuntos da Indonésia, também foi convidado a participar num "briefing" com o novo embaixador.

A razão pela qual o Professor Benedict Anderson está aqui neste momento é que, tendo conhecido artigos da sua autoria que li em diversas alturas, e tendo ouvido falar dele a muitas pessoas, sempre como um dos maiores, se não o maior especialista mundial em assuntos da Indonésia actual, convidei-o para participar nas IV Jornadas de Timor da Universidade do Porto. Infelizmente o Prof. Ben Anderson na altura não podia porque coincidia com o período de exames dos seus alunos. Tendo falado ao Presidente da República nesse assunto e dito que ele poderia vir em Maio ou em Junho a Portugal, e porque o Presidente da República também já tinha ouvido falar no Prof. Ben Anderson, imediatamente decidiu apoiar a sua vinda. O Presidente da República patrocionou, pois, esta vinda a Portugal do Prof. Benedict Anderson, ofereceu-lhe um jantar no sábado passado e deu todo o apoio para que se concretizasse esta deslocação aqui.

...Já estive na Universidade Católica noutras sessões, mas não com a responsabilidade com que estou aqui neste momento em que, de certo modo, represento a Universidade do Porto. Gostava por isso de dizer que me é extremamente grato estar aqui hoje e sentir esta colaboração tão íntima que há entre as duas Universidades, colaboração essa que, em grande parte, se deve ao Sr. Professor Carvalho Guerra. Queria pois agradecer, na pessoa do Professor Carvalho Guerra, o apoio que a Universidade Católica deu a esta iniciativa de trazer a Portugal o Professor Benedict Anderson. Muito obrigado.

(Prof. Anderson)

Distinguished Mr President, my good friend Prof. Barbedo, colleagues, students, it is a great honor to me to be given the opportunity to talk to you about East Timor and Indonesia. I only wish that I had command of your beautiful language and could speak to you in it. So, please be patient with me. In conferences that I have been giving in Lisbon and in Braga, I have been speaking primarily about the importance of liberating East Timor from Indonesia's control. I think in fact that that liberation is coming quite soon. Today, however I'm going to talk about the opposite subject, which is **the great importance of liberating Indonesia from East Timor**. This may seem a strange way to talk, but let me try to lay out for you the argument that the Indonesian occupation and colonization of East Timor has had very damaging consequences also for Indonesia, a country from which I have been banned for twenty years but which I love deeply, where I have spent many years, where I have many friends, many teachers, and many students. So, what happens to Indonesia is just as important to me as what happens to East Timor.

When President Suharto made his initial decision to invade East Timor, he and his New Order - perhaps you could translate this as very close to your Estado Novo - had been in power for nine years. Although he had come to power in an extraordinary campaing of violence, in which, over six months in 1965-66, maybe half a million people, regarded as communists, had been murdered, nonetheless, after 1967 the regime appeared to normalize: political parties were quite active, the press was not heavily censored, and the regime did not attempt to impose any special ideology on the population. Thus there was some reason to think that gradually Indonesia would become less and less under military control, and things would become reasonably decent as the economy improved.

But if we look at the history of President Suharto's 25 years as ruler of Indonesia, we can see clearly that the second half, that is roughly from 1977 till now, has been much more oppressive, much more bloody, than the first half. One very important reason for this has been East Timor. I should say that when Suharto made his decision to invade, he did so only after a long period of hesitation. He recognized that if he ordered the invasion, he would be betraying the tradition of the Indonesian military which had its origins in the courageous guerrilla groups which fought a long and bitter war against Dutch colonialism from 1945 to 1949. It was an Army which regarded itself as an army of national liberation, not an army of colonization. He also knew very well that the last time Indonesia had attempted to do something aggressive outside its borders - when in 1964-65, under the previous president, Sukarno, there had been attempts to destroy the Federation of Malaysia - this had been a great failure. Hence, Indonesia, once Sukarno had been removed from power, quickly changed its policy and made peace with Malaysia. Thirdly, he knew very well that East Timor was quite different from Indonesia. It had over 500 years of contact with Portugal, become deeply imbued, in different ways, with the Portuguese language, Portuguese culture and particularly Catholicism in its Portuguese variant. That mean that the

incorporation of East Timor, which was so very different and Catholic into a country which is 90% Muslim, would not be an easy task. But finally he did make his decision in the autumn of 1975. Now what I want to emphasize to you is that the key-people who helped him made that decision, in fact pushed him into making that decision, are the people whose names are put on the blackboard:

- General Benny Murdani (Javanese, Catholic)
- General Maraden Panggabean (Batak Protestant from Sumatra)
- General Ali Murtopo (Javanese, nominal Muslim)
- Harry Tjan Silalahi (Chinese Catholic from Java)
- Liem Bian-Kie (Chinese Catholic from Sumatra)

You do not need to remember these names, but I want to emphasize the affiliation of these people. What you will see is that they are from different parts of the country, Sumatra and Java, and from different ethnic groups, but they have, with a single exception, one thing in common, that is, they are Christians, mostly Catholics.

This is important because it helps explain some of the contradictions that have emerged in recent years in the relationship between the policy of the Vatican and the policy of part of the Catholic community in Indonesia on East Timor. These five advisers were successful with Suharto, precisely because they were Christians. It was as if they could say: "We know about Catholicism, we know about Christianity, it will be easy". One of these men, Mr. Liem Bian-Kie, visited my University about a month before the 1975 invasion and told me: "Oh, don't worry, it will be over in three weeks. Very simple. They are Catholics like us, we'll take care of it. No problem." Of course it was an enormous mistake.

It is also important to bear in mind that not only at the beginning but right up until today, most of the key Indonesian decision-makers on East Timor, have continued to be Christians. For example, look at the most recent transfers that have been taken place in regard to East Timor. The two senior generals who were dismissed dishonourably after the Dili massacre (for wich they were not responsible) are General Sintong Panjaitan, a Batak Protestant from Sumatra, and General Rudolf Warouw, a Menadonese Protestant from Sulawesi. Their replacements are General Herman Mantiri, a Menadonese Protestant from Sulawesi, and General Theo Sjafei, a Protestant Butonese, also from Sulawesi. Suharto has been very careful not to appoint any prominent Muslims to run policy in East Timor.

As you are aware, the initial occupation was a rather disastrous setback to the Indonesian military. Having thought that it would be all over in three weeks, they found that the East Timor resistence was very tough indeed and furthermore had a substantial supply of NATO quality weapons, because Portugal was a member of NATO. Furthermore, the East Timorese had excellent military leadership to the point that, at the end of 1977, that is, two years after the occupation had begun, according to an American State Department witness

before the United States Congress, Indonesia still controlled only about one third of the population of the country. After two years!! The situation by then was extremely serious for the Indonesians and they realized that only quite new methods would make any difference to the policy they were pursuing. It was in the very tragic period that the Americans were persuaded by the Indonesians to start providing weapons which they did not have till that time, the most important of which was the OV-10 Bronco, a special type of aeroplane which was developed during the Vietnam War for close-up support to infantry operations. The Bronco's were very deadly and brought enormous devastation to East Timor, destroying villages and crops, and terrorizing villagers into fleeing to the lowlands where they were put in resettlement camps which were not very different from concentration camps. As you know, between 1978 and 1980 probably as many as 200.000 people died in East Timor, either by military action or by famine or by disease as a result of the previously mentioned factors.

These Bronco led operations, which had very strong American support, changed the military situation drastically. The resistance found that there was very little they could do against this new kind of high-technology. It is important to know that the Indonesian military would not normally have dared to use this kind of equipment against fellow Indonesians. It would have been politically impossible at that time. This, we can see that although the military were saying the East Timorese are our brothers, this was not true. If they had really thought they were brothers, they would never have acted this way. In fact they treated the East Timorese as if they were enemies and I think that is what they really felt in their hearts. At the same time, the devastation was so great that it had to be concealed, not just from the outside world - you remember no reporters were allowed in, no TV cameras were permitted for a long time - but Indonesians themselves were not given entry. For many years, an ordinary Indonesian was not allowed to go to East Timor without a special permit even though if the government officially said: these are our brothers, this is part of Indonesia. This is one reason why there was very little in the Indonesian mass-media about East Timor until very recently. Because the scale of what had happened was so dreadful and so unjustifiable, that it had to be concealed.

The decision to undertake this extremely violent anti-population type of warfare took place a very important conjuncture in the history of Indonesian politics, because, it began at the end of 1977 and at the begining of 1978 when the Suharto regime was severly shaken by student protests all over Indonesia. All the major Universities in Indonesia had big demonstrations and one of the key demands in those demonstrations was that Suharto step down, that Suharto not be "reelected" for another term as President. It was quite tense for a few days before the Army decided to support Suharto rather than the students and the students were suppressed. Many of them were put in prison and put on trial, yet, it was the first time, that people who had supported Suharto ever since 1965 came out, massively, all over the country against him. So we have to understand that in 1977-78 was a turning-point, and that the problems that the government faced in East Timor encouraged it to act much more violently towards Indonesians than it had done for a long time.

After the crack down on the students, the newspapers were drastically censored, many newspapers were closed, many newspaper editors were put in prison and after that the control of the regime over the mass-media became much more tight than it had been in the previous ten years. If you look through the Indonesian newspapers of that period, it is quite amazing how little information there is about Timor. It was as if East Timor was some sinful family secret. At the same time there was enormous pressure on soldiers in East Timor to produce successful results for Suharto and the Generals; that is, the President and his staff were always saving: Why is it not finished? Why is it still going on year after year after year? This made officers in the field feel that they had to do something drastic and as soon as possible. And so assassinations, extra-legal executions, systematic torture, destruction of villages, brutal treatment of women and children became normal practice. That is, they were not exceptions, they were not things that the military might do if they got angry. They became absolutely routine methods. And since in those days officers who wished to get promoted tried to get an assignment in East Timor, because that was were real fighting was going on, these officers, when they were finished with their tour of duty in East Timor, would go on to other regions with this new mentality, this new level of brutality. You can see the consequences of this very clearly in the years after 1980-81. The most striking example is that in 1983 and in 1984 Indonesia was struck for the first time by Death Squads. Mysterious killers would show up outside the houses of targetted people, who would be dragged from their homes, taken away in jeeps, their hands tied behind their backs, then usually shot in the head and the bodies dropped in the street. Amnesty International reckoned that in 1983-84, about 8.000 people were executed by these Death Squads, who were, in almost all cases, military people in civilian dress. In the popular jokes that were made about these murders, they were typically referred to as Petrus and Mateus, Petrus is an abreviation of Penembak Misterieus, mystrerious killer, and Mateus is Mayat Misterieus, mysterious corpse. The reason why the names of two great christian saints were used is because many of the people responsible for the Death Squads are senior Catholic and Protestant generals. These Death Squads died down for a while after 1984, they have resurfaced in the last few years both in East Timor itself and even more seriously in the Muslim province of Aceh, at the northern tip of Sumatra where a kind of secessionist independence movement is under way. Hundreds of people have been executed in the last two years by these methods which, as I said, were pioneered in East Timor.

Now, there are other aspects of East Timor's influence on Indonesia about which I would like to just say a few quick words. First of all, in the area of foreign policy: Indonesia is today the fourth largest country by population in the world. It is a huge country and a rich country. It has many very able and capable people, and its economy is going ahead quite well on the whole. But if you look at the American newspapers from one year to the next, the country hardly ever gets mentioned. It's a country about which Americans know very little and I dare say even in Portugal people know very little about it. One reason for this is that Indonesia has been unable to play any significant international role in the last fifteen years. Every time Indonesian diplomats come to international fora, it's always East Timor,

East Timor, East Timor, East Timor. Suharto would like to be a famous leader of the Third World but he can't be because of Timor. Indonesia's extremely intelligent Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, would have a very good chance to be the Secretary-General of the United Nations some day. But he will never be as long as East Timor is occupied. This means that East Timor is a major obstacle to the achievement of a variety of Indonesia's key foreign policy goals, goals befitting its size, its wealth, its level of population. It is also the largest Muslim country in the world, but you never hear about it in this capacity.

That is why last month, when Foreign Minister Ali Alatas gave a very important interview to the Indonesian newspapers, not to the foreign newspapers, he said something quite extraordinary. First he said: "We are faced now with a choice on East Timor". Never before, since 1975, did any Indonesian official admit there were any choices. Then he said: "There is a choice. Timor for us is like a sharp stone in our shoe. If you have a sharp stone in you shoe, it hurts when you walk; you can't run; if you try to jump, it really hurts. So, the question for us really is: do we want to keep going with a stone in our shoe. We can do that, but it will go on hurting, we won't be able to run, we won't be able to jump, or..." He didn't say the "or" was, but anybody reading the newspaper knows that it is: Take off your shoe and shake the stone outside. This means, of course: **free Indonesia from East Timor!** Then we can do everything after that, walk normally and have a good time. This is an extraordinary statement from the Indonesian Foreign Minister and it is clearly designed to prepare Indonesian public opinion for a major step towards resolving the problem. We do have a choice: Do we want to go on with a stone in our shoe or do we not?

The second significant consequence of East Timor is the present level of censorship and the way in wich the governement, since the invasion of the East Timor, has tried, much more systematically than ever before, to indoctrinate the population with an official government ideology. There has been an enormous fear that if the censorship breaks down, if it were possible for the newspapers and magazines and TV to tell people what really happened in East Timor, the process could not stop there. People would start talking openly about what has happened in many other parts of Indonesia. But since the Dili massacre the international publicity has been so bad that the regime could not stop the publication of an enormous amount of information from the outside world on Dili and on Indonesia's behaviour there. There has been more in the Indonesian newspapers in the last six months than has been in the last sixteen years. In this way, East Timor, earlier an enormous obstacle Indonesia's democratization and liberation from censorship, may now be helping those processes. Furthermore the regime has developed an ideology, one of whose features he is certainly designed to make people accept East Timor as part of Indonesia, it is what everybody in Indonesia knows as Majapahit-ism. Majapahit was an old Javanese kingdom of the 14th and XVth centuries, just before the Portuguese and the Dutch arrived, which probably controlled the eastern part of Java, Bali and a few islands around that. But this small early kingdom has been mythologized by regime propangandists to the point of saying that almost all the islands between China and the Indian Ocean were originally part of this great empire, including of course, East Timor. So, there is now a historical justification for

moving in; we are reuniting the great ancient kingdom of Majapahit by bringing the Timorese into our country. But this is a complete falsification of real history, and many people in Indonesia know this perfectly well. So what the regime has done is to corrupt the educational systems; that is, the secondary schools, primary schools are getting fed this absurd version of history, and the prime reason for these lies being spread by the regime is to justify internally the terrible policy in East Timor.

There two or three other points I will touch on before bring this talk to an end. The economic costs of the occupation need to be born in mind. The more intelligent members of the ruling group in Jakarta, realized very early that you couldn't get away with simply murdering and massacring East Timorese. The outside world and eventually Indonesia itself would certainly insist that if the Timorese are "brothers", then they must be helped. So a very large amount of money has in fact been spent in East Timor. A lot of roads, hospitals and schools have been built. Some of this money came from Indonesia's own resources, some of it came as aid from the European countries, the United States and Japan. So much money was spent that it has caused considerable anger and jealousy in the provinces of Indonesia next to East Timor, where people see that a lot of money goes to provinces where there is trouble. So it's easy for the logic to develop that if you want to get more money, better help and more development - perhaps you should make some trouble for the regime. So, the combination of financial outlays and oppression is a very bad example for Indonesia and in fact encourages many of the things that the military would like to discourage. Furthermore, the spending of these financial resources has encouraged many speculators, and shady businessmen to move to East Timor to take advantage of government contratcs and government commissions so that most of the money that goes to East Timor doesn't end up in Timorese hands at all; it ends up in the hands of what in America we call carpetbaggers, people who go to a scene of disaster and make money out of that disaster. These people are enormously resent in East Timor, they are like vultures feeding on corpses. The next point is that, as you know, Indonesia has had a very warm and friendly relationship for twenty years with the Inter-Governmental Group of Indonesia, the IGGI, which is a coalition of the World Bank, the United States, the EEC and Japan to give Indonesia lots of money. But this IGGI has recently colapsed because the Chairman of the IGGI, the Dutch Minister of Development, strongly criticized Indonesia after Dili Massacre, saying that further Dutch aid to Indonesia would be dependent on Indonesia behaving better. Suharto flew into a rage, withdrew from the relationship with the IGGI, said that Indonesia would no longer accept any Dutch money from any source.

Now some of the main beneficiaries of Dutch money in Indonesia are Church groups, Catholic and Protestant, legal aid associations which try to protect political prisioners and peasants whose land has been taken away, women workers who are trying to strike, and NGOs who work in many areas of social concern. The cutting off of Dutch aid has for the first time forced Indonesians to think about East Timor. Those people who used to say: Timor is far away and dosen't matter to us, now realize that their own livelihood, their

possibility of being effective as legal aid groups, as NGOs, as Church groups, is directly affected by East Timor. They are starting to reason that: "If only East Timor would go away, then our Dutch relationships could all be resumed, we could all be effective once again."

One final negative point of East Timor on Indonesia has been on the Christian community. As you know, Christians, that is Catholics, and Protestants, are a small minority in Indonesia, maybe something as 5-6% of the population. But they have a power in Indonesia which is completely disproportionate to their numbers. The best schools in Indonesia are Catholic schools, and the Protestant schools are not far behind them. On the whole, Christians are much better educated than Muslims; they are very powerful in the intelligence apparatus in the Army, in the Universities, and in some business organizations. This means that they are rather widely resented by the Muslims. Hence many Christians feel under threat, and believe that it is very important for them to support the government at all costs, because the government is friendly to them and will protect them if there is any popular Muslim movement against them. The problem here, and this is where East Timor comes in, is that the more the Catholic and Protestant communities are identified with the government, which is very repressive and corrupt, the more the Christians are likely to end up as being blamed for close association with the regime. It is a very dangerous position for the future of the Indonesian Christian communities there. Now there have been some very corageous Indonesians, in both the Catholic and Protestant communities, who have tried to help the East Timorese. But general impression one gets is the opposite. If you look, for example at the reasons why the Vatican has taken a very - I'm not sure what the right word is -, but certainly not a decisive position on East Timor, it is because of pressure, not from Suharto but from influential Indonesian Catholics who are afraid of what reversing the present policy or criticizing the policy on East Timor would mean for them.

Hence the East Timor question has had a very corrupting effect on Catholic and, to less extent, Protestant activity in Indonesia.

Let me simply now conclude with a word about East Timor. The Dili crisis has opened a very visible split inside the ruling group in Jakarta. I mentioned to you already the comments of Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, but perhaps more important has been the split emerging between the military and General Suharto who up till now had a very close relationship, because Suharto was a famous general before he became President. This split has to do with many issues, but East Timor is one of them. After the Dili massacre, Suharto did something he had never done before in the history of his New Order which was personally - that is, by himself not through his Army Commander - to dismiss General Panjaitan and General Warouw who were the commanders in Bali and Dili and who, everybody recognizes, were not responsible for the massacre. One reason why these people were dismissed was because the person who many observers regard as the real person responsible for the tragedy, happens to be colonel Prabowo. Prabowo is the President's son-in-law, has extensive business interests in East Timor and has close relationships with a number of the worst collaborators among the East Timorese in Dili. So the Army is angry because two of its most

capable and honest commanders have been sacrificed for somebody who cannot be punished, because he is the President's son-in-law.

The result of this is that a wider division is opening up in Indonesia as well. When, for example, we showed the video of the Dili massacre to students in the United States, Indonesian students would always come and sit silently through the film. Some of them came up afterwards actually crying. They had vaguely known that things were bad but they had never actually seen it with their own eyes in that way. So they started to talk about something which they hadn´t really wanted to talk about for a long time. There are Indonesian students now who openly say that East Timor must be free, must be independent. There are student groups in Indonesia that support the independence of East Timor partly because of shame at what the video showed, but also because they recognize in the video that the people being killed are youngsters like themselves. The most striking thing about the Dili demonstration, for the Indonesians and indeed for all of us, is that it was made up of people who were born after the Indonesian invasion. That is, youngsters whom the Indonesian leaders thought they could turn into Indonesians, if they sent them, to Indonesian schools, and forced them to speak Indonesian, (which they do quite well) yet after all these years it is precisely these young people who now say. "No, absolutely No!" in the language of the colonizer. They say to the Indonesians "Tidak", No! They say to Indonesia: "Merdeka untur Timor Timur" - "Libeartion for East Timor", in Indonesian. This mean that it is all over, the regime's gamble has been lost. They hoped they could get a new generation of East Timorese, the young ones, but they have lost their gamble and there is no chance that they will win it again.

Under these circumstances, it is very important that the pressure on the government of Indonesia continue both in Portugal, in the United States and elsewhere, because it is now possible, I think, to have an effect which was not possible a few years ago. For Indonesia has begun to be openly divided on the issue. That means much more information is coming in. A nice sign of this is that Tempo, the leading Indonesian news maganize - it's modelled on Time Magazine in Americ - recently had José Horta's photo on its cover. It also had pictures of the Lusitânia Express, on its front cover. In effect, a signal has been given liberal and democraticly inclined people in Indonesia that this problem has got to be solved. If it is solved - this is very important - then many of the problems for us Indonesians, wich grew out of the East Timor situation, will be easier to solve too. That is, **the liberation of East Timor is tied to the democratization and liberation of Indonesia itself**. We are actually, in some ways, if I can use a Portuguese comparison, at the moment of General Spinola: that is the ruling group realises that it has no good policy anymore, the ruling group is divided and many people are starting to say this regime has gone on for twenty five years, it is old, it is corrupt, it has no new ideas, it is fossilized; so we must now begin to move. And of course they have the example of Bangkok, where very courageous middle class people, workers, and students, have successfully got rid of the military regime. It will be much harder to do this in Indonesia, but change will come there too. Thank you.

(Prof. Carvalho Guerra)

Está aberta a discussão e peço-vos que ponham os problemas com todo o à - vontade.

I'm fascinated by many of your comments about Indonésia. I think you said that the Lusitânia Express was on the cover of Time Magazine.

(Prof. Anderson)

The Indonesian Time Magazine.

(?)

Oh yes! Because it seems to me, as it does to many people here, that no one in the United States knows anything about Timor. Can you speak about the massacre and what people are saying in the United States, about it? Why there is nothing, or seems to be nothing in the news about Timor? I watched CNN throughout the Lusitânia Express incident and there was nothing, absolutely nothing. I talked to my family, my friends in the United States and none has heard of East Timor, they don't know where it is, they don´t know what it is.

(Prof. Anderson)

That's a very important question. The quick way to answer it is to say that there has not been enough attention to East Timor. But consider this: all the major newspapers in the United States, that is the Boston Globe, The Washington Post, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Time and so forth - every leading newspaper in the United States - has come strongly on the Dili massacre; and quite a substantial number of them are now saying - "it's got to be independence, the Indonesian policy is a failure and there's no solution except freedom!. I have recently seen José Ramos Horta in Lisbon, who has just come from United States and he says that he has had access to top people in the United States in the last two months that he never had before. He was invited to speak before the Council on Foreign Relations, which listened very respectfully to his proposals for a peace initiative. And we have had very successful teachins in a number of Universities including Harvard, Cornell my own University, and Brown University which have been attended not by fifteen or twenty people but by hundreds. This is something completely new.

Finally it's important to see the rising number of Senators and Congressmen who are now supporting resolutions which strongly criticize Indonesia.

There is a bill before the Congress, which, if passed, will cut off some kinds of military aid to Indonesia. It has got very interesting support both from the liberal left part of the Congress and much more important, politically, at the moment, from the most conservative right wing Senators and Congressmen as well. This coalition from different sides of the political spectrum reflects a rising tide of impatience with Indonesia. I should add also that everybody is aware that Suharto is 71 years old, that regime has lost momentum and is becoming increasingly repressive, and that preparations have to be made for change. I think that even in the State Department they are thinking about this.

As for the mass media, the big television channels - there are so many other things going on in the world - I mean, they think that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crisis in the Middle East, problems with Japan, are simply more important for Americans than East Timor.

The press has actually been not bad at all, much less good than the Portuguese, obviously, but it's really not bad. It's the TV that has been very poor, in fact, shamefully poor.

(Someone from the audience)

I think you just touched very slightly a problem that, I would say, it's a little bit dramatic for us Portuguese to talk about. Some months ago, I think it was the last Portuguese Governor of the territory of East Timor that published a book in which he said it was the very truth about Timor. I would like you to say some words about what you think of the Portuguese at the time they left East Timor. I think that is very controversial and I would like to hear what's your opinion.

(Prof. Anderson)

Well, this is something which many people here know much better than me. When I was observing the events in 1974-75-76 I was angry about what seemed to be the abandoning of East Timor by Portugal. In some way, I am still angry about it. But it's not easy for me to be too angry, because I live in America, even I'm not an American, and what the United States did is much worse than what Portugal did. So, I don't feel that I'm in a position to throw stones into your glasshouse. I also think that one has to be a bit humble about this. If you and I had been in the position of Vasco Gonçalves or anybody else in that very chaotic, and fastmoving situation, who knows whether we would have done much better. Maybe you would, I hope I would, but it was a very chaotic time for Portugal. It was not just East Timor, it was Mozambique, Angola, many different things, especially the colapse of the old fascist regime which had been there for so long. This is not exactly an excuse, but at least I think makes things more understandable. You don't agree? Please tell me what you think.

I would like to say that I'm here at least as much to learn as I am to teach. I can teach you a bit about Indonesia, but I am learning from many people about Portugal, about East Timor.

(palavras que mal se ouvem da plateia)

I suppose, perhaps, what was the thinking of the rulers in Portugal about East Timor. And I believe they were blaming the same for East Timor as they blamed for Angola, Mozambique, Guinnea, everywhere, and perhaps Indonesia - I'm not trying to defend Indonesia. I'm against invasion - but what about the Americans, for example? What about the Portuguese, why didn't they do more? I think that one of the main reasons for this problem is the Portuguese inefficiency, leaving the colonies, don't you think?

(Prof. Anderson)

Perhaps I could make one comment on that. One evening I asked Prof. Barbedo, who has been enlightening me on many things in the last few days, who he regarded as the Portuguese most responsible for the tragedy in East Timor. He said - General Costa Gomes. I said to him: Why? He answered: Well, Costa Gomes said: "Look, these people would have become, Indonesians if only the Indonesian Army hadn't behaved so badly". That means that in Costa Gomes's mind East Timor was not like Mozambique, not like Angola. It was like Macau and Goa. The East Timorese could have become Indonesians quite easily, so we Portuguese didn't do anything really wrong. The people who did something wrong were the Indonesians who committed all the atrocities. Our policy was quite reasonable, if only the Indonesians hadn't been so horrible! I think this helps to explain at least some of Lisbon's decision-making. If you think of Goa and Macau rather than Mozambique and Angola, you may get a perception of the thinking of the ruling group in Portugal at that time. That's my guess anyway.

(Someone from the audience)

Gostaria de dizer primeiro que gostei muito de o ouvir, provavelmente porque disse coisas que nos agradam. Esse cenário optimista que traçou deixou-nos muito satisfeitos. Quando se referiu à pouca importância relativa que a Indonésia tem no cenário mundial atendendo ao seu peso enquanto país, em termos quer de pessoas quer económicos, disse-me algo de novo. Eu não tinha muito essa ideia. Tinha a ideia de que, por exemplo nos Estados Unidos, a Indonésia era um país bastante conhecido e com bastante poder, em termos, por exemplo, da comunicação social. Ideia que foi até reforçada quando ouvimos as reportagens da deslocação de Ali Alatas aos Estados Unidos. Gostaria de ouvir a sua opinião sobre isso. Como observador atento. Teve muito impacto a deslocação de Ali Alatas aos

Estados Unidos, na sequência do massacre? Ele viajou pela Europa, pelos Estados Unidos e o que nos disseram é que teve muito impacto. Isto era o primeiro comentário que gostaria de lhe ouvir.

Depois, algumas das coisas que eu gostaria também que referisse têm a ver com: se sente que há uma mudança da política dos Esatdos Unidos em relação à Indonésia e portanto também em relação à questão de Timor. Será significativa ou muito significativa a nomeação do novo embaixador americano para Jakarta?

Se fosse possível também gostaria de saber o que pensa sobre a evolução que se pode prever para a Indonésia.

(Prof. Anderson)

It's an excellent series of questions. Let me just say that I teach at a very expensive private university in America yet I always have to explain at the begining of the class where Indonesia is. If you give students an empty map they are quite likely to put Indonesia where Iran is, or Japan or something like that. Ali Alatas's visit was, in my view, a very great failure. It was not on the TV at all. You would never have known that Ali Alatas was in Washington when he came there. So, silence about Lusitânia is also silence about Alatas. Friends of mine who went with him for press briefings said he got very angry and started even to have some tears in his eyes. He went away saying he had been humiliated and badly treated by the American repporters and by some of the Congressmen. So it was not at all a success. In fact that is one of the reasons, I think, why the statemant about the stone in the shoe was made. Alatas recognizes that Indonesia is having great difficulties. Another indication of this: In earlier years if you had a forum on East Timor or on any other aspect of Indonesia, the Indonesian Embassy, would usually send somebody to give the Indonesian regime's point of view. But since the Dili massacre, they haven't dared attend any meeting of any kind. They are just too afraid of what the reaction is going to be and they also know that there are Indonesian students in the audience and that they will have to face them too. So what they do is to ask the State Department, low level State Department people, to appear in their place to give the official Indonesian position. But it is very embarassing, of course, for them.

Let me say another thing on this questions. There is a new ambassador going to Djakarta very soon. He is not one of the old Indonesia group in the State Department, he's a man who has worked in East Europe with the democratization movements in that region. My guess is that he has been appointed because the Secretary of State, James Baker, who is a very intelligent man, probably the best Secretary of State America has had since the 50s, has decided that you want a new man if you want a new policy. You don't promote officials who have been dealing with Suharto for many years. The State Department knows that I've been banned from Indonesia for a long time, but I have been asked to come down to help

advise the new ambassador. Certainly one of the things that I am going to impress on him, as much as I can, is the **urgent need to free Indonesia from East Timor.**

Another thing is that I have a distinguished colleague who is quite conservative; he has always supported the Suharto government and even supported the Timor policy for a long time. We are good friends but we have completly different political ideas. After the East Timor massacre, he changed his mind 100%. So much so that he has written very good letters in Indonesian to Ali Alatas and to friends of his who are senior Indonesian diplomats. He has also written a letter to people responsible for Indonesian policy in the State Department. All these letters are excellent. They will have all the more effect precisely because they come somebody who, as all these people know, has been a strong supporter of Suharto for so many years. Not from Professor Anderson, who is a bad person! What is very striking in the letters is that they are written from the point of view that I have tried to address today, that is, that **the democratization of Indonesia, the liberalization of Indonesian domestic politics, and the end of repression, depend on the liberation of East Timor**. The State Department has been getting pressure for years from pro-Timor people, and they've always said: "Well, it's a small country, it doesn't matter, who cares?" In others words, the people who came to the State Department always said: Free East Timor from Indonesia. What the State Department is hearing now is: **"Free Indonesia from Timor"**. This they had not expected and I think it will have more impact.

(Someone from the audience)

O professor Anderson, entre outros méritos, fez-nos pensar esta questão num ângulo diferente e de uma forma inovadora - a questão de Timor como uma necessidade que a própria Indonésia tem de alijar uma carga que não pode suportar, uma pedra no sapato, e fez-nos sobretudo pensar esta questão em termos de um futuro que até pode ser relativamente próximo. Trouxe-nos portanto uma espécie de lufada de ar fresco e com imensa esperança, esperança que de certo nós comungamos, esperança que nós temos mas que ainda assim gostariamos de ver confrontada com algumas dúvidas. Por exemplo eu, que acho que todos nós nos devemos mobilizar em torno das questões do futuro e do futuro imediato, e neste caso o que interessa sobretudo é inverter as posições da Indonésia. Os Timorenses fizeram a sua auto-critica, em Portugal fizemos a nossa auto-critica, só que não podemos cair no logro, que ainda é um logro indonésio, de nos pormos a discutir essas questões do passado sem pensar que é necessário inverter as posições que estão a bloquear o futuro próximo. O professor Anderson apresentou precisamente a possibilidade de, não muito longinquamente, vermos acontecimentos novos, mudanças substanciais na política interna da Indonésia. Eu queria perguntar concretamente o seguinte, em relação ao quadro algo optimista que nos foi apresentado: Como é que se compagina esta situação da Indonésia, isto - a necessidade que alguns líderes, que algumas camadas de opinião sentem de alijar o peso incómodo de Timor -, com a política continuada, deliberada em relação, por

exemplo, ao Timor Gap, à exploração do petróleo? Quem pensa alijar uma carga não se compromete tanto com questões deste tipo. Quer dizer, eu não intensificaria da mesma forma a exploração do petróleo. Há iniciativas económicas, nomeadamente esta, que não são próprias de uma potência que está propensa a repensar a sua presença. Fica-se com a ideia, ao pensar no Timor Gap, que a Indonésia está para se manter durante muito tempo. Portanto a pergunta é: como é que se compagina este optimismo com esta situação em concreto e com outras idênticas?

(Prof. Anderson)

I think the paradox will resolve itself, I mean, the role we can play as outsiders is obviously fairly limited. I think there's room for many imaginative possibilities. My optimism really rests on an analysis of the structural forces at work. These are very powerful, deep forces which have a long term historic dynamic to them. I think that the recognition by the military that they are up a young generation of East Timorese who speak Indonesian, but refuse to be Indonesian, is very clear. I think that the end of Suharto regime is coming quite soon. The ruling class is already quite divided within itself. One thing that I haven't discussed today, because it is not directly connected to the topic, is that the reason why the great powers, particularly the United States, have supported Indonesian policy, was complicit with the policy, was because Indonesia was regarded as a bulwark against communism in Asia. After all, Suharto had personnaly arranged for the massacre of half a million communists and the complete destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party. But today gratitude to Suharto is no longer very important, there is no communism that matters in Asia and East Timor. The end of the Cold War means that anticommunism is not a good reason to support Suharto in the future. It is also true, as many of you know, that the secret agreement between the United States and Indonesia, which permitted American nuclear submarines to pass through Indonesian waters (including the Timor Straits), without surfacing, is no longer relevant, because the Soviet Union doesn't have satellites watching the movement of American submarines . If the Amercians now decide that they want to surface going through Indonesian waters, who cares? Thus some of the reasons why America and some western countries and Japan supported Suharto for a long time are now obsolete. The decay of the regime in Indonesia, the fierce determination of young Timorese not be Indonesian and the very important changes in the external world, all are converging. There's a kind of logic here that you could observe building up at the end of Caetano regime: that there was no possibility of the situation continuing, it was moving towards some kind of explosive resolution. The world forces, the internal Portuguese forces, the forces in the colonies were all moving together to end a situation which had become intolerable. It wasn't a very good way to end it, perhaps, but it did end it. Our concern must be to try and work so that the resolution in Indonesia is a peaceful and as humane as possible. We can all make some contribution in this regard.

I would say one thing in particular here because of the place where I am speaking: if any of you have contacts with people who can talk to Indonesian Catholics, it would be good to talk very seriously about the risks that the Catholic community is running now by its identification with the East Timor policy. It is very important that the Catholic community, for its own future physical and moral well-being to stop lobby with the Vatican against a good policy in East Timor. I say this also, because many of the most important generals responsible for the policy, are in fact Catholics. There are also quite a few Protestant generals as well, and Europeans and American Protestants should urge the same thing on them.

(Someone from the audience)

About Timor oil, Timor Gap, in this context. How can this issue of Timor Gap act in the scenery that you gave us?

(Prof. Anderson)

Well I think that two things are happening. One is that the Portuguese to their credit are pursuing a case in the International Court of Justice, I hope that the case will be prosecuted vigorously and a great deal of pressure will be on Indonesia and Australia . But I also think that, in some ways, the oil may be a useful thing in the end. When the final negociations take place between Indonesia, Portugal, and the Timorese, one of the bargaining points will be the oil. That is, it may be that Portugal and East Timor will have say: If you go peacefully we will be happy to have you participate in the development of our oil resources. In that sence I think Timor's oil is not necessarily a negative. It depends on how the diplomats pursue their policies.

(Prof. Carvalho Guerra)

Some of the questions can be integrated.

(Alguém do público)

Como disse indirectamente Ali Alatas e o Professor referiu aqui, a aposta da Indonésia em Timor Leste foi completamente perdida. Pensa portanto que a libertação de Timor Leste poderá passar por decisão Indonésia, obviamente com pressão internacional, ou terá de passar por uma revolução contra o regime, como se viu ultimamente na Tailândia, ou eventualmente com a morte de Suharto?

(Prof. Anderson)

This is a very good question. The example I will give you is not from Portugal this time, but from Brazil. You will recall that up until the late 1880s slavery still existed in Brazil - the only important country in the world where it still existed. It was clear to anybody watching that it was inconceivable that slavery would continue in Brazil - till 1910, 1920, 1930. That is, the historical process was already making clear that slavery was obsolet, so it was only a question of time and method how slavery would be eliminated. What nobody could predict in 1887 was exactly how it would happen. Whether the emperor would survive or not, whether decisions would be taken with violence or peacefully. None of us knows the future. All we know is, I think, that slavery in East Timor has to end in the way that slavery had to end in Brazil. I think it is unlikely to happen while Suharto is President, but I don't think he is going to be President for much longer. My assumption is that the change will speed up at the moment when the regime breaks appart or is undermined from within. May be with Suharto's death, I don't know. What I'm sure of is that Suharto will never retire willingly. In his own mind he is the king.

(Prof. Carvalho Guerra)

Could I maybe also put one question. Is there no doubt, from what I gathered and from what I have been reading and from listening to you today, no doubt whatsoever that the democratization shall happen. How long, is he problem. But, they have the Japanese support, they have the United States support, they have Australian support and not very far away they even have some EEC support. That means, democratic countries are supporting Suhart's regime. A few years before Indonesia would represent all that was correct because it would represent to all something against Soviet Union and then I could understand. I think the question was made to you a few moments ago: that the reason why they got that support is because they represent 180 millions of buyers. So, it is a good market. I lived in the United States for five years, back in 1961 and I remember one night talking with the Rector of my University and with the best professors including two Nobel Winners, they didn't know that the population of Brazil was at that time 100 million people and was bigger than the States without Alaska. And they had to phone to the Library to be sure that I wasn't lying. What I'm saying by these words is - to move the population of America is very difficult. Johnson against Barry Goldwater, I saw that campaign, three days after they were wandering in the streets with Barry Goldwater and people wouldn't know who he was. That means that people are not very much interested in the United States on things which do not concern them directly. The Soviet Union was very well known by most of the students, most of the professors, the remaining was difficult for them to know.

My problem is, when you touched the religious problem. Within twenty years, on the other side of the Mediterranean, there will be more muslims than on this side. In our side, Europe, in Paris, one million, just in Paris. What will it happen if the catholics in Indonesia

desappear, blamed as the killers of the other catholics called Portuguese people who were not catholics in 1975? Because the movement was the communist movement trying to take over at that time. So, how are going to raise the question towards getting the christian people of this side of the world towards the majority muslim people? Would that be a change of a muslim to be President of Indonesia?

(Prof. Anderson)

Suharto is officially a muslim himself. He is fanatic about his own power, not about religion.

Texto retirado de uma gravação sonora e revisto pelo Prof. Benedict Anderson e pelo Coordenador das Jornadas.

Porto, 29 de Março de 1993

A. Barbedo de Magalhães